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RECENT DECISIONS
THE NARcoTICS PROBLEM: OUTLOOK FoR REFORM
Drug addiction is a contemporary problem faced by most civilized nations.
It has been estimated that there are approximately 60,000 drug addicts in the
United States today' and more than half of these addicts can be found in four
states having large metropolitan concentrations where the problem is most
acute-New York, Illinois, California and Ohio.? Drug addiction has been
defined as the use of narcotics, usually the opium derivatives, 3 such as heroin
and morphine, in a compulsive manner resulting from the habit-forming char-
acteristics of these drugs.4 Once drug use is initiated, and the individual is not
motivated to discontinue, psychological and physiological dependence upon it
results, creating a state wherein the body needs a constant dosage to retain a
normal balance of functions. To sustain this condition, a steady supply of drugs
is needed which can only be purchased at high prices from illegal sources, and
since the addict is almost invariably in a low, if not the lowest socio-economic
category, he will usually take to crime, principally property offenses that are
somewhat lucrative, to support his habit.
To deal effectively with the legal problem that is presented by drug
addiction, it is especially helpful for .the lawyer to have some comprehension of
the various factors that produce addiction. The typical addict is a product of an
urban slum, although as we shall see, this is not always true and has in fact not
always been the rule. In such areas are to be found the greatest concentration
of social problems and the highest rates of criminality.5 There is usually a pro-
nounced lack of community solidarity and family cohesiveness and a lack of
conventional controls over youth groups, the groups from which many new
addicts are recruited.8 Many of the members of these groups have serious per-
1. Any estimate of the number of addicts at large at any particular time is necessarily
precarious. It must depend upon the obvious fact that not all are known by law enforce-
ment agencies and the methods of tabulation and documentation of statistics by the various
agencies involved are not uniform, nor in some cases reliable. As is the case with much
contemporary statistical analysis, the available data is too often presented with a view to
reinforcing a judgment arrived at before investigation and is, therefore, colored by the
viewpoint of the compiler.
2. See Eldridge, Narcotics and the Law (1962).
3. See Eddy, The History of the Development of Narcotics, 22 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 3 (1957).
4. A comprehensive definition of drug addiction has been put forward by the World
Health Organization as quoted in Interdepartmental Committee on Narcotics, Report to
President of the United States 3-4 (1961):
Drug addiction is a state of periodic or chronic intoxication, detrimental to the
individual and to society, produced by the repeated consumption of a drug
(natural or synthetic). Its characteristics include: (1) An overpowering desire
or need (compulsion) to continue taking the drug and to obtain it by any means;
(2) A tendency to increase the dose; (3) A psychic (psychologic~l) and sometimes
a physical dependence on the effects of the drug.
S. See Illinois Institute for juvenile Research, Drug Addiction Among Young Persons
in Chicago 6 (1953).
6. Lohman, The Participant Observer in Community Studies, 2 Am. Sociological
Rev. 890, 894 (1937).
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sonality difficulties that are not resolved within the framework of conven-
tional problem-solving techniques. Growing up in the midst of urban poverty
and disadvantage, with little or no opportunity to break out of the socio-
economic ghetto in which they live, there is a natural tendency on the part
of these youths to base their behavior on patterns of conduct exhibited by
older models in their community, patterns of crime and anti-social behavior
generally7 The use of drugs as a personality problem-solving technique
may be valued positively by the community or group within which the
individual moves, or at least is a solution lacking the strong measure of con-
demnation which obtains in the larger society. Both criminality in general
and the use of drugs in particular may, therefore, result from the same
influences to which these youngsters are exposed. To many, delinquency and
narcotics addiction may have presented themselves as independently valued
patterns of behavior and solutions for stress-situations, and these youths may
have chosen either or both of these alternatives.8 Once the habit is contracted
a life of crime may be necessary to support it, but it may be too hasty a
generalization to attribute the criminality exclusively to the addiction. Both
patterns of behavior are part of a distinctive career process that is in a very
real sense inescapable for the individual caught up in the environment of the
disadvantaged segment of society.9 To the individual addict, the use of drugs
may be a seemingly successful problem-solving technique10 for a personality
disorder that might otherwise manifest itself in more serious anti-social behavior
patterns.1 The statistics clearly indicate that the proportion of addicts in-
volved in the violent categories of crime upon the person such as murder, rape,
or aggravated assault, is much smaller than generally supposed by the general
public.'
2
Since addiction is a form of anti-social behavior involving acts of crimi-
nality, it is apparent that the problem must be viewed from at least two
aspects, the medical and the legal. Prior to 1914 the problem was essentially
a medical one involving questions of treatment rather than penal sanctions.
There was a ready supply of legal drugs available and the number of addicts
7. See generally Chein & Rosenfeld, Juvenile Narcotics Use, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob.
52 (1957); Gerard & Kornetsky, Adolescent Opiate Addiction: A Study of Control and
Addict Subjects, 29 Psychiatric Q. 457 (1955).
8. See Dumpson, Gang and Narcotics Problems of Teen-Age Youth, 6 Am. J. Psy-
chotherapy 312 (1952).
9. This is the segment of society that produces the bulk of criminal and anti-social
behavior, as well as that having the highest ratios of personality and mental disorders.
See generally Meyer, Social and Psychological Factors in Opiate Addiction (1952).
10. For the multiplicity of pre-addiction mental disorders that find imperfect solution
in the use of drugs see Fort, Heroin Addiction Among Young Men, 17 Psychiatry 251
(1954).
11. It has been estimated that as few as 3.8% of those who become addicted to
narcotics could be-termed psychiatrically normal according to medical criteria. See Kolb
& Ossenfort, The Treatment of Drug Addicts at the Lexington Hospital, 31 So. Med. J.
914 (1938).
12. See Finestone, Narcotics and Criminality, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 71 (1957).
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was estimated to be in the neighborhood of 100,000."' This situation changed
in 1914 with the passage of the Harrison Act 14 which was the product of a
general public feeling that drug addiction should be curbed. On its face the
Act was a revenue statute that regulated the purchase of drugs; its effect was,
as intended, the prohibition of all narcotics for non-medical purposes which
included the satisfaction of addiction.' 5 This Act and the policies of the federal
agencies that have administered it, represents the distinctly American cor-
rectional approach to what, as has been noted, constitutes an international
problem. This viewpoint, as contrasted with what may be termed the medical
approach found in almost all other Western countries, assumes a criminal
disposition before the fact of addiction.' 6 The medical approach focuses first
upon the pre-addiction personality disturbance which manifests itself in a pre-
disposition to drugs, the initial use and subsequent habit formation and the
resultant development of a pattern of criminality to support the addiction.'-
While the Harrison Act and its correctional approach has been an undenia-
ble success as a means of regulating the flow of drugs,' 8 it has not solved the
problem of addiction. Instead, it has created other problems and negated the
effectiveness of the medical profession in dealing with what remains basically
a medical problem. There is growing dissatisfaction in both the legal and
medical professions with the correctional approach, and there has been a marked
increase in the movement for a more scientifically oriented program based upon
the much needed therapy for addicts rather than incarceration.'
Prior to 1914 drug addiction was not confined to any particular social
class in America; it was a problem that affected most segments of society to
some extent. The Harrison Act changed this fact considerably by putting the
stigma of criminality upon addiction, and in effect, making the addict a criminal.
As a result the use of drugs soon filtered down to the lowest socio-economic
groups in society.20 Since organized criminal activity is directed in large
13. Finestone, supra note 12, at 79.
14. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. § 785, as amended 26 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4736.
15. The Act was held constitutional in United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
16. "The procession of events is from criminality to addiction, or from defective
personality to criminality to addiction." Bureau of Narcotics, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Traffic
in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs 6, 7 (1939). The addict "is generally a criminal or
on the road to criminality before he becomes addicted. Once addicted he has the greatest rea-
son in the world for continuing his life of crime." Anslinger & Tompkins, The Traffic in
Narcotics 170 (1953).
17. Pescor has pointed to the statistical fact that in the majority of cases addiction
precedes criminality. See Pescor, A Statistical Analysis of the Clinical Records of Hospi-
talized Drug Addicts, 43 Public Health Rep. 6 (1938); Pescor, The Problem of Narcotic
Drug Addiction, 43 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 473-74 (Nov.-Dec. 1952).
18. See Comment, Narcotics Regulation, 62 Yale L.J. 751 (1953).
19. See Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association on Narcotic Drugs, Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease? (Interim and Final
Reports, 1961).
20. The overrepresentation of Negro and Puerto Rican groups and the present con-
centration of drug addiction among the lowest socio-economic strata is illustrated in
Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 86th Cong..
2d Sess. 140 (Jan. 26, 1960).
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measure towards these urban groups, and since non-medical drug dispeizing
is illegal, the highest rates of addiction understandably occur in the disad-
vantaged areas where access to the drugs may be found. The importance of
access to drugs as a part of the total problem also explains the only excep-
tion of any importance to the general rule that drug addiction is concentrated
among the lowest socio-economic groups-the fact that the rate of addiction
among members of the medical and paramedical professions is thirty times
higher than that of the general population..
2 1
After the passage of the Harrison Act, it was possible, for a short time
at least, for the medical profession to continue its role in the treatment of drug
addiction. Drugs could be dispensed by physicians for "legitimate medical
purposes" which was generally understood by the profession to include thera-
peutic programs which might entail the dispensing of narcotics to addicts to
sustain them in their condition while undergoing psychiatric treatment or
to effect a gradual withdrawal. The medical profession expected to continue
prescribing drugs in the course of professional practice in good faith, and with
rare exceptions, it assumed its responsibilities to those afflicted with drug addic-
tion Tithout running afoul of the new law. However, a seric,. ,f , ascs dealing
with federal prosecutions of docto- s iho had dispenscd d,,>,. in violation
of the Harrison Act were adroitly manipulated by the t dcral Narcotics
Division of the Treasury Department into a full scale rout of the medical
profession from the field of addict-therapy. In Webb v. United States2 2 and
fin Fuey Moy v. United States23 the Supreme Court held that the Act
proscribed the pr scription and dispensing of drugs for the purpose of sustaining
addiction. Both cases involved flagrant abuses by doctors who had indiscrimi-
nately sold drugs and prescriptions to addicts with no view toward rehabilitation.
The decision of the Court in both of these cases clearly rested upon the patent
bad faith of the individual defendants involved. Finally in 1922 in United States
v. Behrnan24 the Narcotics Division obtained a major victory when the Supreme
Court approved an indictment of a doctor who had indiscriminately dispensed
drugs to addicts. The indictment was deliberately drawn to exclude the element
of "good faith" on the part of the doctor, an element that had been specifically
provided for by the Act. 25 A dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, con-
curred in by justices Brandeis and McReynolds recognized the dangers inherent
in the majority holding and its deviation from the intent of the framers of the
Harrison Act. The inevitable followed. Imbued with the missionary zeal that
pervaded the activities of the Treasury Department during the ill-fated folly
of the Prohibition era, federal agents conducted a relentless campaign of
prosecutions of doctors who were still dispensing drugs as a part of their
21. Eldridge, op. cit. supra note 2, at 27.
22. 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
23. 254 U.S. 189 (1920).
24. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
25. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. § 789 as amended 26 U.S.C. § 4724(c).
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therapeutic treatment of addiction. The .Behrman indictment, having removed
the element of "good faith" from such treatment, was used effectively to halt
virtually all such activity. The few doctors who resisted this attempt by a
government agency to prescribe the course of professional medical treatment
of a recognized illness were made examples of by prosecutions and con-
victions. 6 Three years later, in Linder v. United States27 the Supreme
Court rejected the Behrman indictment and clearly set forth that it was never
the purpose of the Act to remove the medical profession from the treatment of
addiction and that the "good faith" administration by a doctor of drugs to an
addict was not within its proscription. However, this clarification of the role
of the medical profession in such treatment came too late. The efforts of
the Narcotics Division had caused the medical profession to abdicate its role
in the treatment of drug addiction at the grass roots level of the practicing
physician, a role which it has never resumed. The last legitimate source of
drug supply had been effectively closed, but was soon replaced by the lucrative
illegal traffic initiated by organized crime. 8 Thus the efforts of the Narcotics
Division had two major results: it successfully cut the addict off from recourse
to medical treatment and made possible a thriving new source of revenue for
the coffers of the crime syndicates. 29
At the core of the present philosophy of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
is the firm belief that the only mode of rehabilitation and cure for addiction,
aside from incarceration, is that of isolation in an institutional setting. This is
in sharp contrast to the out-patient, ambulatory type of treatment favored
by most medical authorities. Accordingly, two federal hospitals were established
in 1929 for the exclusive treatment and rehabilitation of addicts.3 0 They are
operated by the United States Public Health Service and are located at Lex-
ington, Kentucky and Fort Worth, Texas. Roughly two-thirds of the patients
at these hospitals are voluntary; the other one-third are sent for treatment as
a result of conviction for violation of federal narcotics laws or under a sus-
pended sentence granted on condition that they submit to treatment. Space is
limited at these hospitals and there is frequently a long waiting period before
admission. An effective physiological withdrawal is produced and an attempt
26. Manning v. United States, 287 Fed. 800 (8th Cir. 1923); Hobart v. United States,
299 Fed. 784 (6th Cir. 1924).
27. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
28. See King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and
the Sick, 62 Yale LJ. 736 (1953); Note, Narcotics Regulation: A Study in Irresolution, 34
Temp. L.Q. 310 (1961).
29. See King, Narcotics Drug Laws and Enforcement Policies, 22 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 113, 126 (1957):
Year after year, the pattern remained the same. Addicts and small-fry peddlers
were arrested by the thousands; the traffic prospered; and the overloads at the
top of the illicit operations never got near "the stuff" and were rarely brought to
account. This fantastic black market, where smuggled drugg brought thousands
of times their intrinsic value, remained an exclusively American phenomenon,
playing its part, along with bootlegging, in the rise of gangsters and the emergence
of big-time organized crime.
30. 45 Stat. § 1085 as amended 42 U.S.C. § 257.
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at psychotherapy -is made. This latter aspect of the treatment is not notably
effective because of the limitations upon the time and personnel available, but
it may well represent the only opportunity for psychiatric treatment that will
present itself to most of the addict-patients, the majority of whom labor
under some form of mental distress.3 1
The success of this federal program cannot be called dramatic or even
encouraging if one takes the statistics on relapse at face value without some
elaboration. Relapse is recognized as a distinct part of the addiction syndrome.
-Most addicts who are finally freed from physical as well as psychological
dependence upon the drugs reach this goal only after a number of attempts
and subsequent failures. For many others the cycle always ends in failure.
Accordingly, the estimate that well over half the patients at the federal
hospitals return to the use of drugs is not to be taken as an indication that
rehabilitation is either impossible, or that the approach of these hospitals is
faulty. In spite of its many limitations, and in view of the relatively few state
or private hospitals that are equipped to handle addict rehabilitation, the federal
hospital program represents the most ambitious attempt at narcotics addiction
rehabilitation available in the United States, and in fact, in the world. 32
The approach taken by the various states, parallels the basic correctional
approach of the federal government. New York, which accounts for over
forty percent of all reported drug addicts in the United States today, has a long
history of carefully drawn legislation dealing with the problem.33 Possession
of drugs, a crime in all states, may be either a felony or misdemeanor depending
upon the quantity of drugs held.34 This represents an attempt to reach the
peddler rather than the addict with the more repressive punishment. The
possession of specified large amounts of drugs creates a rebutable presumption
of an intent to sell. The selling of narcotics by unauthorized persons is a
separate offense as is the possession of instruments for the administration
of the drugs.35
In addition to incarceration for narcotics offenses, New York also provides
that a person arrested on a narcotics or other criminal charge and found to be
addicted to drugs may be considered for civil commitment and rehabilitation
in a state hospital. 36 A unique facility for the specific treatment of adolescent
addicts is maintained in New York City at Riverside Hospital. An ambitious
program of a multi-sided therapeutic approach is employed which has achieved
encouraging results. Some twenty-four percent of those discharged were able to
abstain from the use of drugs for at least six months, an important indication
31. See Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob.
23 (1957).
32. Kolb and Ossenfort, supra note 11.
33. A recent legislative report is: State of New York Joint Legislative Committee,
Report on Narcotics Study (1959).
34. N.Y. Penal taw § 1751."
35. N.Y. Penal Law § 1745(d).
36. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law §§ 200-216.
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of eventual recovery. The cost of treatment per patient is quite expensive, but is
undoubtedly warranted if a sufficient number of recoveries can be produced
by the program.37 Chief among the reasons why the rates of recidivism are so
high among discharged patients is the fact that the former addict almost
invariably returns to his former environment, the very setting that played
such a large part in producing his narcotics habit. While physicians are to
report all addicts under their care, they are allowed to treat them without
interference by the state and may prescribe narcotics for purely medical
usage. Narcotics addiction per se is not made an offense.
California is also representative of an ambitious and basically well thought-
out approach to the narcotics problem. 38 There are separate offenses for
possession with intent to sell and the sale itself, although the penalties for the
sale are less severe than those for possession. There are also penalties for the
possession of administrative implements. 39 Machinery for civil commitment
and treatment is provided,40 and addiction per se has been made criminal.41
The state has established a most extensive statutory plan for the treatment
of addicts by the medical profession. The amount of drugs to be administered
at successive stages of withdrawal; where and with whom addicts may undergo
treatment; filing with the state of all medical prescriptions for drugs; the
prescribing of the doctor's choice of treatment for the addict-these are some
of the regulatory measures designed to rigidly control the methods of therapy
employed by the medical profession.4 While it is not open to question that
the state maintains a vital interest in controlling the use and traffic of narcotics,
any attempt, either direct or indirect to control the therapeutic procedure of
individual doctors in treating what is essentially a medical problem must be
cited as a most undesirable legislative infringement upon the competency and
independence of the medical profession. Such a precedent has been recognized
as deplorable and conducive to further unwarranted excursions into the pro-
fessional sphere of discretion of the healing arts.
4 3
While New York State has adopted the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1932, California has elected not to do so, The approach of the Uniform Act
is basically correctional and aims at strict control of all narcotics use and
traffic, with penalty provisions left to the various states that adopt it to
determine for themselves. No concerted attempt to regulate the professional
treatment of addicts employed by individual doctors is attempted as is the
37. See Chein and Rosenfeld, Juvenile Narcotics Use, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 52
(1957).
38. A recent statistical study is: Bureau of Criminal Statistics, State Dep't of
Justice, Narcotics Arrests in California (July 1, 1959-June 30, 19§0).
39. Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 11000-11797.
40. Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code § 5350.
41. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11721.
42. Cal. Health and Safey Code §§ 11390-11395, 11425-11426.
43. Eldridge, op. cit. supra note 2, at pp. 60-61.
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case with the.California approach. The Uniform Act has been adopted by 47
states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.
The American correctional approach is not typical of that used in other
Western countries faced with the same problem. Unfavorable comparisons
have frequently been drawn between the approach employed in Britain, which
is fairly typical of that used in Western Europe, and that employed in the
United States in terms of concrete results. The success of the British System
compels thoughtful consideration. There the problem has been considered as
primarily a medical one, one calling for programs of treatment prescribed by
those who have traditionally dealt with the treatment of medical problems
as such, that is, the medical profession, not the legislature. The British statutes
proscribe the non-medical use of drugs and their purchase, similar to the
Harrison Act's provisions, and the provisions of the various states. Only
through medical channels can drugs be legally obtained. This, however, is
where the similarity between the two systems ends, for the British doctor is
allowed to prescribe treatment for drug addiction according to a methodology
followed and approved by his own profession. This may and usually does
include prescriptions for narcotics to effect gradual withdrawal, or, if repeated
attempts at withdrawal have failed due either to psychological or physiological
factors, or both, drugs may be prescribed to sustain the individual in as
normal a life-pattern as possible. This latter aspect of the British system is a
frank and realistic admission by the authorities that not all cases of addiction
are susceptible of cure and recovery.
This attitude contrasts sharply with the boundless optimism that lies at
the core of the American correctional approach, that all cases of addiction
can be eliminated, either by outright penal incarceration or something which
in many such cases closely approximates this, that is, civil commitment. Such
an assumption is usually considered by the medical profession as unscientific
and unrealistic, much the same as would be an assumption that all other forms
or manifestations of mental illness are susceptible of complete alleviation.
There is general agreement among medical authorities that.in the case of some
individuals who have become addicted to narcotics, the proper and indeed the
only "cure" possible may be the sustaining of the individual on a controlled
level of narcotics with attendant therapeutic treatment, so far as it may be
effective in alleviating some of the individual's psychological difficulties. While
the comparatively smaller proportion of addicts in Britain may be ascribed
to sociological factors different from those in North America, making any
comparison necessarily a precarious one, it is not unfair to draw some con-
clusions unfavorable to the correctional approach from the fact that the medi-
cally-oriented approach of Britain has practically eliminated the illicit drug traf-
fic formerly utilized as a source of revenue by the elements of organized crime.
It would not be unreasonable to expect that a system which allowed drug
addicts to obtain narcotics through legal rather than illegal channels would
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undoubtedly work to remove the illegal drug traffic from the contemporary
American scene. The general correlation between addiction and criminal
activity, whether this be the various crimes connected directly with the habit
itself by statutory definition, or other patterns of crime to support the habit,
is practically unknown in Britain today.4"
If the results of the British approach must be seriously qualified to answer
the proponents of the correctional approach who point to the radically different
sociological conditions that prevail in the two countries, further example may
be found in the Canadian solution to the problem. With few exceptions, the
narcotics problem in Canada, small as it is in comparison to that in this coun-
try, is concentrated in the principal metropolitan area of Quebec and more
importantly the highly industrialized and populous Niagara Peninsula area
of Ontario where sociological and cultural conditions are similar to those in the
United States. Most of the conditions that are conducive to drug addiction
among certain sub-cultural groups in Chicago, Detroit or Buffalo, are par-
alleled in like groups, though on a smaller scale, in Hamilton, Toronto or
Montreal. Yet the Ottawa government, which had previously followed a
correctional approach similar to that in the United States has recently replaced
this with an approach aimed at securing treatment for all addicts, with com-
plete discretion in the judiciary as to the disppsition of offenders of the narcotics
laws. 45 Thus it would seem that under conditions somewhat more similar to
those in the United States than those in Great Britain the correctional system
has been found wanting, and has been replaced by a medically-oriented system
anticipating as positive a solution to the problem as can be expected with
present resources.
Finally, it must be made ciear at this point, to be further clarified below,
that the basically different social and economic conditions of Britain and
Western Europe, and even perhaps Canada, are not self-supporting reasons of
justification for the radically different correctional approach in the United
States. The imposition of penal sanctions with a half-hearted program of
rehabilitation in place of a medically oriented program for what remains a
medical problem should be able to find at least some justification in substan-
tially large numbers of concrete examples of success, but, sadly enough, this
is not the case. Taking the varying statistics of almost any reliable source,
and comparing them with pre-Harrison Act figures, and considering also the
tremendous cost of this system to society over the years, tangible as well as
intangible, it is not surprising that both the legal and medical professions
have answered the call for serious attempts at basic reform.48 That there is a
44. See Lindesmith, The British System of Narcotics Control,,22 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 138 (1957).
45. See the remarks in the House of Commons of the Minister of Justice, Hon. E. D.
Fulton, 105 Canadian H. C. Deb. (No. 126) 5982-88 (4th Sess., 24th Parliament, June 7,
1961).
46. Eldridge, op cit. supra note 2.
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growing public awareness that narcotics addiction, like alcoholism and mental
illness, is a social problem in need of concerted community interest and planning
is doubtful. Until much of the mythology and misinformation concerning the
problem can be eliminated, public awareness and resultant interest in more
positive programs of treatment appear remote. Only then can we expect real
reform from the legislatures as a result of public pressure. It may be that
deliberate governmental programs of propaganda and education which have
helped to reshape public attitudes toward mental afflictions in general and to
spur specific legislative reforms in particular, may have some beneficial effect
in the area of drug addiction.
Essential to the fulfillment of any such optimistic prediction must be the
realization, by those agencies of government most directly involved, and
ultimately by the public at large, that drug addiction is an illness. That fact,
long recognized and understood by the medical profession, has now been
given further and significant recognition by the Supreme Court in the recent
decision of Robinson v. California,4 7 in which the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a California statute48 making the status or condition of drug addiction
a crime. The Court held that since drug addiction was an illness, any punish-
ment therefor would inflict a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The case has, in the first instance, great importance in the realm of constitu-
tional law. However, its effect will undoubtedly go far beyond this immediate
sphere of importance.
The appellant had been stopped on a street in Los Angeles by a police
officer who had observed needle marks and scar tissue on his arm. He was
arrested and charged with a violation of section 11721 of the California Health
and Safety Code. At the trial, testimony by a member of the Narcotics Division
of the Los Angeles Police Department was offered to show that while appellant
was not under the influence of narcotics or suffering withdrawal symptoms
at the time of examination he had used drugs at least seven times in the fifteen
days immediately preceding his arrest. The jury was instructed that the ap-
pellant could be convicted under the statute for having used drugs or for being
addicted to their use, that is, for having the status of a drug addict: "'All that
47. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
48. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11721.
No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of
narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person
licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics. It shall be the burden
of the defense to show that it comes within the exception. Any person convicted
of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be
sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in
the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation
for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is
granted requife as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the
county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power to
absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation of spending at
least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.
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the People must show is either that the defendant did use a narcotic in Los
Angeles County, or that while in the City of Los Angeles he was addicted
to the use of narcotics. . . . ,,49 A definitiofi of drug addiction and a description
of the status of being a drug addict was tendered for the jury's consideration.
The jury was further instructed that it could return a general verdict of
guilty if it were satisfied that a violation under the statute had occurred:
"'It is not necessary that the particular act or status or condition so agreed
upon be stated in the verdict.' ,5 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty
and appellant was sentenced to a 90-day prison term. The conviction was ap-
pealed and subsequently affirmed -by the Appellate Division of the Los Angeles
County Superior Court,51 the highest state court in which appellant's case
could be heard.
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Mr. Justice
Stewart, pointed out that the statute was to be distinguished from others which
punish the possession or sale of narcotics or implements to administer it.
Insofar as the constitutionality of a state's power to regulate or proscribe
the traffic in drugs has been established, 52 the Court did not doubt that punish-
ment for a violation of a statute embodying such a legislative intent would be
constitutional and hastened to point out that its decision did not in any way
adversely affect such legislation.50 Neither was it doubted that a state could
establish compulsory treatment for narcotics addiction or other illnesses danger-
ous to the public safety and welfare, or procedure for the civil commitment
of such individuals.54 However, accepting the view that addiction is an illness,55
the Court held that a statute making such condition or illness, or for that matter
any illness, a punishable offense, would be an infliction of a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution: "We hold that a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as
a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
49. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 663.
50. Id., n.4.
51. See the unreported opinion, People v. Robinson, Super. Ct. No. CR A-4425, App.
Dep't Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, March 31, 1961, found in Record, p. 102, Robinson v.
California, supra note 47.
52. See Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Mfartinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) testing the
constitutional validity of a Minnesota statute regulating the sale and possession of
narcotic drugs. The statute was held consistent with the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
53. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 664.
54. Id. at 665.
55. The majority refers to addiction as a "disease." This is in accord with the
terminology used by many writers on the subject. See Howe, An Alternative Solution to
the Narcotics Problem, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 133 (1957). Both "disease" and 'illness"
are undoubtedly useful descriptions of the narcotics addiction syndrome but it is perhaps
more accurate from the medical point of view to speak of addictiqn as a symptom or
condition indicative of a mental or psychiatric disorder. It has even been suggested that
the use of the term "disease" in reference to any condition of mental abnormality is of
little utility from the medical point of view. See Cavanaugh, A Psychiatrist Looks at the
Durham Decision, 5 Catholic U.L. Rev. 25 (1955).
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State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."50
This application of the Eighth Amendment stricture against cruel and
unusual punishment marks the first truly clear-cut use of this Amendment
against state penalties by the Supreme Court. The original position of the
Court had been that the amendment was not applicable to the states,57 but
in the 1946 case of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber 8 involving a bizarre
incident where a convicted criminal's first execution by electrocution failed
to accomplish death, making a second attempt to complete execution necessary,
the Court assumed that the Eighth Amendment had been absorbed into the
Fourteenth and was applicable to the states. Inasmuch as the Court held that
it was not a cruel or unusual punishment to subject a defendant twice to
electrocution where the first attempt had failed, due to a purely technical fault
in the apparatus, the full import of this assumption could have been open to
some doubt. The present case must be seen as sweeping away any such
remaining doubt and adding unequivocally one more freedom embraced by
the Bill of Rights to the arsenal of protection afforded national citizenship
through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 9
The initial application of the Eighth Amendment involved fact situations
where the severity of the punishment in relation to the crime was drawn
into question.6" In a more recent case the mental suffering of a defendant
caused by the punishment of deprivation of citizenship was considered in
determining the severity of the punishment.61 However, in the instant case the
Court determined that the offense to the Eighth Amendment was not in the
form, duration, or severity of the punishment, but rather, in the fact that there
was punishment at all where the appellant's only crime had not been an overt
act, but only a condition or status indicative of a mental and physical illness.
The only other status crime that had been successfully attacked as violative
of the Eighth Amendment was that defining a "suspicious person" as a criminal,
but the Court in that case left no indication as to how useful the Eighth
Amendment would be in striking down similar statutes 'punishing a proscribed
status.62 The usual method of attacking such status crimes on constitutional
grounds prior to Robinson had been on the basis of their alleged vagueness.
0 3
It can be expected that in the future the Eighth Amendment will once aguin
56. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 667.
57. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
58. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
59. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is long-standing in our
tradition. The wording of the Eighth Amendment is identical with that of the Bill of
Rights of 1688 promulgated in England. Bill of Rights, 1 Will. & Mary. Sess. 2, C. 2 (1688).
60. An able short survey of the general area is to be found in 3 Catholic L. Rev.
117 (1953).
61. Trop v.-Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
62. Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (D.C. Cir. 1900).
63. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) ("gangster"); Edelman
v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953) ("dissolute person").
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be revived as a means of attacking such status crimes as "vagrant," "gangster,"
etc. While the instant case represents the first clear-cut application of the
Eighth Amendment by the Supreme C6urt to the states by virtue of its absorp-
tion into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be noted
that the lower federal courts have been in the process of such application for
many years.
64
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas dwelt at length upon a
review of the literature from the medical profession tending to establish
addiction as an illness or disease and encouraging its treatment as such. The
strong humanitarian considerations that are seldom absent from his deliberations'
prompted him to point to the possibility of other forms of illness being made
criminal if drug addiction were allowed to be so designated in the face of
the Eighth Amendment: "But I do not see how under our system being an
addict can be punished as a crime. If addicts can be punished for their addic-
tion, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. Each has a disease
and each must be treated as a sick person."63 And: "We would forget the
teachings of the Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime
and permitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age of enlighten-
ment cannot tolerate such barbarous action."66 Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in
the result on the grounds that the instructions given to the jury allowing appel-
lant to be convicted for his presence in the state while addicted to narcotics
would, in effect, allow punishment for a bare desire to commit a crime (use
narcotics) .67
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark was grounded upon a belief
that section 11721 is part of a comprehensive program of treatment, with penal
sanctions intended to reach the "volitional" user of drugs while its civil com-
mitment counterpart, section 5355,68 which provides for commitment to a state
hospital for treatment, is intended to reach "non-volitional" users who cannot
be deterred by the ordinary threat of penal sanction. Section 5355 provides
for commitment of drug addicts defined as "any person who habitually takes or
otherwise uses to the extent of having lost the power of self-control any
(narcotic)... ." This form of civil commitment, looking toward rehabilitation
and cure of the "non-volitional" addict, was thought not to be of use in aiding
a defendant such as Robinson because he could not be proven to be a "non-
volitional" user of drugs. He could, however,-be punished for his condition or
status, for being addicted to drugs in a manner not to be considered as "non-
64. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd per curiam or other
grounds, 338 U.S. 864 (1949); Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 934 (S.D. Cal.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862
(1951).
65. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 674.
66. Id. at 678.
67. Ibid.
68. Cal. Welfare and Institution Code § 5355.
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volitional," and in this manner be subject to "treatment." 9 The "treatment"
envisioned by this view is the bare isolation afforded by a 90-day jail term
pursuant to conviction under section 11721, nothing more than this being
expressly provided for by the statute. Thus penal incarceration takes on an
aura of therapy for Mr. Justice Clark.
If this were indeed the purpose of section 11721 one would expect to find
some substantial indication on its face or in its application by the California
courts. However, no nice distinction between "volitional" and "non-volitional"
users of narcotics presents itself on the face of the statute. 0 Only those who
are "under the influence of," or "addicted to the use of narcotics" are spoken
of and an easy assumption that the statute has in all probability been applied
indiscriminately to "volitional" as well as "non-volitional" users contrary
to the purpose imputed to it in the dissent is borne out by its application in the
California case of People v. Ackles. 7' In Ackles the defendant was traveling
through the state when he suddenly became ill. He consulted a doctor who
considered him to be addicted to narcotics and had him arrested. Medical
testimony was given at the trial under section 11721 that the defendant was
an involuntary user of drugs who was currently in some stage of withdrawal.
The existence or non-existence of withdrawal symptoms is frequently used as a
standard to ascertain whether or not a defendant is a "volitional" or "non-
volitional" user of drugs. If withdrawal symptoms are present, a physiological
dependence upon drugs is indicated and the frequent assumption is that the
defendant is a "non-volitional" user of drugs. In the Ackles case it was clear
that the defendant was a "non-volitional" user according to this definition-
yet he was not committed under section 5355; he was convicted under section
11721. Thus it appears that California has applied section 11721 to involuntary
users of narcotics contrary to the view taken by Mr. Justice Clark, a view also
shared by Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion. 72 Regardless of whether
or not this section is applied to "volitional" or "non-volitional" users of drugs,
the value of a 90-day period of isolation without a provision for rehabilitative
therapy for what remains an illness in spite of any effort to attach degrees to it,
is dubious. Whether the addict is a "volitional" or "non-volitional" user, he
needs help. He will not get it within the bare confines of a prison cell with
nothing more added. And although section 113913 indicates that some form
of therapeutic treatment could be administered-to one convicted under section
11721, no such provision appears in the latter and no saving assumption seems
warranted. As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out: "The difference between
(section) 5350 and (section) 11721 is that the former aims at treatment of the
addiction, whereas (section) 11721 does not. The latter cannot be construed to
69. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 681.
70. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11721.
71. 147 Cal. App. 2d 40, 304 P.2d 1032 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
72. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 685.
73. Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11391.
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provide treatment, unless jail sentences, without more, are suddenly to become
medicinal."
74
Perhaps much of the difficulty inherent in the minority's position lies in the
tenuous distinctions that are drawn between the "volitional" and "non-
volitional" use of drugs. It is difficult enough to define addiction, although the
usual and most convenient method is to determine whether or not the individual
evidences physiological withdrawal symptoms.5 If this is found, it is usually
possible to say that the individual has lost effective control over his power of
will to take or not to take narcotics, and assuming (as we must) that he can
formulate a conscious desire to desist, he is not able to act out this desire
because of the overpowering physiological need to sustain a certain level of
usage.
If the definition of a "non-volitional" user of narcotics were to be grounded
solely upon a showing that withdrawal symptoms were present and physiological
dependence established, this would not perhaps be entirely accurate because,
as noted above, there is always the capability, though sometimes submerged,
of entertaining a desire to desist from usage. By the same token, it is quite
possible that an individual who did not exhibit withdrawal symptoms and was
not therefore physiologically dependent upon drugs could still be psychologically
so dependent upon his occasional administration thereof that he could be
said to have lost effective control over the power of will to stop this occasional
pattern of usage. If the distinction between "volitional" and "non-volitional"
use of drugs were to turn merely upon the absence or presence of physiological
withdrawal symptoms, and penal or civil "treatment" to depend upon this, as
the minority opinion has suggested, it is readily apparent that many "voli-
tional" users who in fact have lost effective control over the power of will to stop
their occasional use of drugs would be rendered the "treatment" of a jail
sentence without an opportunity of real therapy to remove the underlying cause
of usage. It is submitted that these individuals have a real need for therapy to
displace a psychological dependence upon the usage of drugs, even though it
be occasional, and that they will not obtain such help through the "treatment"
afforded by a 90-day jail term.
Clearly then it is not difficult to recognize that any distinction between
"volitional" and "non-volitional" use of drugs is either arbitrary, when only
the absence or presence of withdrawal symptoms is used to define the terms,
or is impractical if more technically refined distinctions are to be introduced
to a jury of ordinary intelligence. In practice the California courts have not
found it practical to make such distinctions and have convicted defendants
under section 11721 who would, in some cases at least, qualify as "non-
volitional" users of drugs.
74. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 677, n.5.
75. Winick, Narcotics Addiction and Its Treatment, 22 Law & Contemp. Prob. 11
(1957).
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It must be remembered that a moral concept of free-will lies at the core
of our natural and common law heritage.76 The recognition of illness and its
need for treatment poses no threat to traditional concepts of punishment for
voluntary action that offends the law. Punishment for acts that are the product
of a diseased mind, insofar as this condition has been recognized at the various
stages of historical development, has never been sanctioned by western society."
Such recognition was built into our Constitution, itself a product of the natural
law, and finds expression in present-day applications of the Eighth Amendment
in striking down examples of cruel and unusual punishment offensive to the
principles of the natural law philosophy. The majority has recognized that it
is the status of addiction, of being ill, that is punished by a statute such as
section 11721 and that an addict who may be classified as "volitional" is as
sick and deserving of therapeutic treatment as is the addict who might be classi-
fied "non-volitional" by any standard. As Mr. Justice Douglas observed, pierc-
ing the veil of arbitrary classifications of addiction raised by the minority and
the different modes of "treatment" that could be accorded each: "Section 11721
is, in reality, a direct attempt to punish those the State cannot commit civilly.
This prosecution has no relationship to the curing of an illness. Indeed, it
cannot, for the prosecution is aimed at penalizing an illness, rather than with
providing medical care for it."7s
One of the arguments raised in support of the statute by Mr. Justice White
was that the primary purpose of a law such as section 11721 is to remove
the venue requirement that must be met in a prosecution for the use of narcotics.
In California a conviction for use must be had in the county where it has taken
place,7 -9 but this is difficult to show in many cases. Where it cannot be shown,
and only the evidence of use, such as needle marks or scar tissue remains,
the practice has been to prosecute under section 11721. Thus it may be that
the statute serves a practical purpose, but the fact is not avoided that the
prosecution of such status remains, in substance at least, a prosecution for
an illness.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White has, however, touched
upon a point that is certain to present itself to the Court for future resolution
and perhaps eventual extension of the scope of the instant ruling. It is simply
this: if a state cannot punish for the status or condition of drug addiction, how
consistent with the Eighth Amendment stricture will be those statutes that
proscribe the use of drugs? 0 It is apparent that an addict uses drugs because
he is addicted to their use. For the same reason he will possess narcotics as
well as the instruments for their use and may perhaps even sell narcotics to
76. See O'Sullivan, Christian Philosophy in the Common Law, Aquinas Papers, No.
6 (The Newman Press 1947).
77. For the Thomistic view see Friel, Punishment in the Philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas (1939). -
78. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 677-78.
79. People v. Garda, 122 Cal. App. 2d 962, 266 P.2d 233 (1953).
80. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 688.
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other addicts to support his own habit. He will use, possess, and sell narcotics
only because he is addicted to them, because he has the status of being an
addict, a state or condition which cannot now be punished.
It may be enough to say that all of these elements are severable and that
the inability of the states to constitutionally proscribe the status of drug addic-
tion will not affect the constitutionality of the incidents thereof. The concept
of severability has been attacked in the California courts in People v. Ayalael
wherein a defendant who was first convicted of a violation of section 11721
was later tried and convicted of section 15000 (possession) where both charges
grew out of the same incident (defendant had been picked up while in a
state of addiction with a package of heroin in his possession). The court held
that the defendant had not been placed in double jeopardy because possession
was not a "necessarily included offense" that could not give rise to two prose-
cutions. The dissenting opinion, however, argued that there had been but "a
single indivisible transaction."
How long the question of severability of the status from use will remain
unanswered can only be the subject of conjecture. While the Court in the
instant case has undertaken to reaffirm the constitutionality of a state's
approach to the problem of narcotics addiction by proscribing "unauthorized
manufacture, prescription, sale, purchase, or possession of narcotics within
its borders,"' 2 it failed to include the proscription of the use of narcotics in its
reaffirmation, which along with possession is one of the major avenues to
conviction of drug addicts. It is not unlikely that a state's proscription of the
use of narcotics will soon fall under the scrutiny of the Court and suffer the
same fate as the status crime. The extension is logically inescapable and is in
fact desirable for the same reasons that recommend the holding in the
instant case.
Against the background of the contemporary dispute between correctional
and medical approaches to the problem it has been suggested that narcotics
clinics be established to dispense drugs legally to addicts. The very suggestion
is anathema to the federal agencies and to the proponents of the correctional
approach. While such clinics may help to solve some of the problems created
by addiction, they do not, of course, solve the problems that create addiction;
in fact they may encourage it.83 Drawing on the example of dispensing clinics
that operated for a short time after the passage of the Harrison Act sheds
little light on their practical effectiveness. They were rather persistently
harassed by the federal government until all were finally forced to close, and
little statistical data remains to judge their utility.84 While their reinstatement
under carefully controlled conditions has been advocated in recent years by
81. 167 Cal. App. 2d 49, 334 P.2d 61 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
82. Robinson v. California, supra note 47, at 664.
83. See Eldridge, Narcotics and the Law 110 (1962).
84. See Howe, An Alternative Solution to the Narcotics Problem, 22 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 132 (1957).
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reputable sources their utility has also been seriously questioned and in fact
discouraged by equally convincing sources.8 6
The growing signs of awareness among both the legal and medical pro-
fessions of their joint responsibilities in meeting the problem of drug addiction
are evident in recent co-operative efforts. Early in 1955 a Joint Committee
was established by the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association to explore the effectiveness of existing law enforcement and medical
approaches to the problem and the possibility of working out a reform
program. A great deal of statistical data has been prepared and a thorough
study made by representatives of both professions.
The Interim and Final Report of the Joint Committee contains a number
or interesting proposals.87 An out-patient experimental clinic on a strictly
controlled and regulated basis has been recommended to explore the feasibility
of dealing with unresponsive patients who are not helped by the usual institu-
tional treatment. The possibility of the deployment of such clinics as useful
tools for shutting off the illegal traffic is cited, and the overall objective of the
experiment is intended to be the gathering of data and information about the
effectiveness of present modes of treatment and the testing of hypotheses as to
new and alternative measures. s8 The approach taken by the Joint Committee
on these proposed experimental clinics is quite cautious and in all respects
mindful of its nature as an hypothesis. Unfortunately, it was quickly labeled
as a call for the establishment of "dope cafeterias" by ardent proponents of the
correctional viewpoint, including of course, the Federal Bureau of NarcoticsA0
In spite of these charges, the proposal is an honest and intelligent result of
much thoughtful research and deserves a measure of serious consideration.
Further recommendations of the Interim and Final Reports of the Joint
Committee include continued research into the effectiveness of existing legisla-
tion dealing with the problem, further follow-up studies of drug addicts treated
at present facilities with emphasis upon determining the factors involved in
the high rates of recidivism, and the implementation of a program to educate
the public concerning the problem. The Final Report recommended the disso-
lution of the Joint Committee with its work to be carried on by the existing
committees and research programs of the two Associations. It was approved
and adopted by both Associations. What future studies, either joint or separate,
are to be undertaken by the Associations with resultant recommendations and
prograts of action are not clear at this point, but it is to be hoped that the
85. New York Academy Of Medicine, Sub-Committee on Drug Addiction, 31 Bull.
N.Y. Acad. Med. S92 (1955).
86. American Medical Association, Council on Mental Health, Report on Narcotits
Addiction, 165 IJA.M.A. 1970 (Dee, 14, 1957).
87. Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association on Narcotic Drugs, Drug Addiction: Crime or Diseae? (Interim and FTiaReports, 1961).
88, Id. at 164.
89. Eldridge, ap4 cit. supra, note 83, at 39.
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Interim and Final Reports represent a beginning that will eventually bear fruit
in a positive and more successful approach to the problem than that which
exists today. In the words of Judge Morris Plescowe, speaking for the Joint
Committee: "strict law enforcement and severe penalties are therefore not the
easy answers to the problems of drug addiction. We must look elsewhere for
a rational drug control program for this country." 90
JAMS P. MANAK
INSURANCE COMPANY LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In Northwestern Casualty Co. v. McNulty the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of
Appeals, applying Virginia and Florida law, held that an insurance company,
although liable for $37,500 compensatory damages, was not liable for $20,000
punitive damages assessed against its insured. In the instant case insured, a
drunken driver, attempted to pass the car driven by plaintiff, where such a
maneuver was impossible, at a speed of 80 m.ph. or higher, crashed into the
rear of plaintiff's vehicle and then fled.1
Basing its holding on public policy and stressing the "criminal charac-
ter" of this wrong, the court held that punitive damages in such circumstances
are meant to punish a defendant and concluded that a defendant is not punished
if he can shift the burden of punishment to an insurance company.2 Noting
that punitive damages are recoverable for wilful, wanton or reckless acts,3 the
court made the degree of irresponsibility and disregard of others the standard
for recovery.4 The label punitive or wanton will not alone make insurance
companies immune from liability. Each case will be viewed individually.5 The
concurring opinion pointed out the vagueness of the term "punitive damages"
and the hairline distinction which often separates wanton from ordinary negli-
gence.6
The individual character of offenses for which punitive damages lay goes
back to English Common Law. Intentional torts by officers of government were
grounds for recovery in a 1763 case, HBickle v. Money.Y There, plaintiff was
falsely imprisoned by defendant under an illegal warrant. Although he was
detained only six hours and very civilly treated, "with beef steaks and beer," s
90. Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association on Narcotic Drugs, op. cit. supra note 87, at 22.
1. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
2. Id. at 442.
3. Id. at 433.
4. Id. at 442, n.20.
5. Id. at 442.
6. Id. at 443-44.
7. 2 Wils. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); accord, Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Str.
691, 93 Eng. Rep. 787 (1726).
8. Huckle v. Money, supra note 7.
